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Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

September 11, 2001 marked a pivotal change in our lives, our Army, and our country. When terrorists commandeered four U.S. airliners and used them as weapons, they changed the world forever. They not only struck at America but at those in the world who deplore such barbaric cruelty and sacrilege. Before the sun set on that day a strong and willing coalition was already coming together to declare a war on terrorism—a war that will not be won quickly. We cannot stop with the destruction of terrorist military strongholds. This is only the opening campaign in a very long war. Nations around the globe are bringing to bear all diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military resources to root out and destroy all terrorist networks and create an environment that will not support their resurgence. Subsequent campaigns will be aimed at both terrorist organizations and those states that support or harbor them. Our nation is leading the fight, the role of the Armed Forces is crucial, and the American people are staunchly behind us.

Colonel Melanie R. Reeder
Editor in Chief

Special thanks to Ms. Peggy Peoples, visual information specialist, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, for her great contribution in designing the cover.

Secretary of the Army's Remarks to Soldiers

My fellow field soldiers all over the Army, from Kosovo to Korea, wherever you may be pulling your duty: As you all know by now, our nation, this department, and the United States Army were attacked on 11 September.

I want you to know that we have survived that attack. That attack has made us stronger, and we are now engaged in what our President has called the first war of the 21st century. We will win that war.

Now the war is not going to be won in a single day, or a single raid, or a single event. We are engaged in a campaign against a cowardly enemy. And it will take us a while to root him out. But let there be no question about our resolve, our discipline, our professionalism, our tenacity; and in the end, the result of that war.

It started at a point in time dictated by the enemy. It will end in a point in time—as the President has said—of our choosing.

It won't be easy. But few things that are truly worth doing ever are. This is our challenge: to preserve the freedoms that make America what Abraham Lincoln called the 'last best hope on earth.' And I can assure that the civilized people in countries of the world have united in support of our cause.

You and I, the American soldier and the veteran, now carry the hopes of the American people on our shoulders. I know that you will do your duty. I have every confidence in that as does the Secretary [of Defense], the Chief, and the President of the United States.

America expects no less of you and I, and we can do no more. And always know that wherever you are, your nation stands behind you with absolutely solid support.

The Chief, General Shinseki, and I extend our condolences and ask God's tender mercies on our former comrades and their loved ones. We have 74 people unaccounted for in our headquarters. We will mourn them and we will shed our tears. They are part of our family. But once that's finished, we will go forward, with anger and with purpose in our hearts, to see this campaign through to the end.

Tuesday, September 11 has already been described as the darkest day in American history. I say to our adversaries, be very, very careful, for you are going to experience the finest hours of the United States Army as we prosecute this campaign against you.

God bless you; God bless the Army; God bless our great nation.

Terrorism and Crabgrass

Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Schifferle, US Army, Retired

Terrorism, like crabgrass, can never be completely eradicated. We can choke it out by persistently strengthening the resolve of the world not to tolerate it.

THE WAR ON terror may be better understood if considered in light of a metaphor—a comparison with an everyday experience that might help frame the operational and strategic issues of this new type of war.

Consider the homeowner whose lawn is afflicted with a bad case of crabgrass. His object is to replace the crabgrass with healthy grass. To achieve his object, he needs a program that destroys individual crabgrass plants and simultaneously replaces the crabgrass with a healthy, vibrant lawn. The most important part of the homeowner's program is growing strong healthy grass where crabgrass cannot thrive. In this metaphor, the international community of nation-states can be compared to the homeowner's lawn, with crabgrass being terrorists and healthy grass being antiterrorist nations. The goal of the international community is to root out terrorists and to grow nations opposed to terrorism. Furthermore, the international community must create an environment where terrorists cannot thrive. Without national sanctuaries—fertile, open soil in which to grow—terrorists cannot thrive. Just as crabgrass withers when exposed to harsh sunlight, denied water, and vigorous uprooting, so too will terrorism wither when exposed to the heat of international censure, denied support from sympathetic governments, and attacked and vigorously rooted out from its sanctuaries.

The most important requirement in combating crabgrass is good soil preparation. Good soil preparation requires the coalition opposing terrorism to be perceived as friendly to Islam. If the soil preparation is inadequate,

that is, if the greater Islamic community believes the United States and the nations of the coalition threaten the existence of Islam, no effort can ever establish a healthy lawn—the United States and the coalition will never win. The United States would need to sterilize the lawn, import new topsoil, and start over. This is within the United States' capability as a superpower, like starting over is within the capability of many homeowners, but in both cases, the costs are extravagantly high.

Fertilizer and water contribute to good soil preparation. Fertilizer needed to assist seed germination can be likened to the protection given friendly nations from foreign aggression because of their membership in the coalition. The water that keeps the healthy grass alive can be compared to support from a broad coalition of friendly nations given to nations opposed to terrorism. This healthy grass seed—antiterrorist nations—cannot prosper without adequate water—economic aid, diplomatic initiatives of treaty structures, assistance with health care and education, and the development of a healthy nation-state moving confidently into the future.

Crabgrass—terrorists—must be destroyed using the combination of two strategies. One strategy is the periodic and consistent application of pre-emergent, or chemical weed killer. Pre-emergent can be compared to the unswerving defeat of any nation-state government that supports, harbors, funds, or otherwise helps any terror group. This minimizes the growth of new terrorist groups and inhibits the revival of remnants of old terrorist groups.

The second strategy is the removal of the plants' roots. The prudent homeowner never just pulls the tops off the crabgrass. Such a practice is futile because the roots remain. Crabgrass is by its very nature designed to survive that type of attack and grow

back. To eliminate the terrorist threat, the international community cannot settle for simply hunting down, bringing to justice, and executing individual terrorists. Such a strategy is akin to the homeowner who pulls the tops off the crabgrass in his lawn. Rather, nations involved in the war against terrorism must attack terrorists and their infrastructures persistently. They must attack not simply the terrorist but the organizations that provide direction and guidance and the supporting nations that afford the terrorist sanctuary and freedom of action. The antiterror war must pull terrorists up by the roots: destroy organizations through local counterterror intelligence operations, precise military strikes, and occasionally the forceful occupation of territory.

The appropriate and proper operational posture in this war against terrorism:

- Destroy the al-Qaida terror group worldwide. This is the equivalent of pulling out the old crabgrass by the roots. It will work against the old crabgrass, but does little to prevent its reemergence.
- Remove the Taliban from governance in Afghanistan and replace them with any form of government desired by the people of Afghanistan, the only requirement being this government does not support or harbor terrorist groups with global reach. This is the same as an initial application of chemical weed killer. However, in a good crabgrass control regimen, additional applications of pre-emergent are needed every season.
- Support the post-Taliban government of Afghanistan with massive infusions of American foreign assistance, humanitarian aid, support from the United Nations, nongovernment organizations, and private volunteer organizations. Grant Afghanistan favorable trading relations with all nations of the coal-



tion. The model for this aid should be the Marshall Plan, the U.S. economic aid package that rebuilt Europe after World War II. It is also possible that irredentist populations could be satisfied with significant adjustments of international borders. In the crabgrass analogy, this measure equates to fertilizing new grass.

- Be prepared to take military action against nation-states that show signs of supporting international terrorism. This harsh, but necessary step, is the seasonal application of pre-emergent.

- Be prepared to provide nation-states that have been the subject of military action stemming from their support of international terrorists aid and relief packages as that provided the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan.

This seems a tall order, but any alternatives are worse. Indecision, hesitation, undue deliberation—any of these will delay the day when the international community of nations ends the reign of international terrorism. With this infusion of quality grass seed, and with frequent watering, the new grass will flourish, and terror with global reach will be choked off by prosperity, freedom, and tolerance. **MR**

Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Schifferle, US Army, Retired, is Director of the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship at the School of Advanced Military Studies, CGSC at Fort Leavenworth. A 1994 graduate of SAMS, he served in plans and operations assignments in the 3d ACR in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, in V Corps supporting peacekeeping in Bosnia, and in armor and armor cavalry units in the United States and in Korea. He has a Masters Degree in German History from the University of North Carolina, an MMAS from SAMS, and is a PhD candidate at the University of Kansas. Since 1997, he has been a member of the permanent faculty at the SAMS. He has also served on the history faculty at the United States Military Academy.



Americans are asking, “How will we fight and win this war?” We will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every

necessary weapon of war to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network. Now, this war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat. Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations secret even in success.

President George W. Bush





What we're engaged in is very, very different from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Kosovo, Bosnia—the kinds of things that people think of when they use the words “war” or “campaign” or “conflict,” Rumsfeld told reporters in the Pentagon. It is very different (from) embarking on a campaign against a specific country within a specific timeframe for a specific purpose.



Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

You don't do it with just a single military strike, no matter how dramatic. You don't do it with just military forces alone, you do it with the full resources of the U.S. government. These [terrorists] try to hide, but they won't be able to hide forever. They think their harbors are safe, but they won't be safe forever. I think one has to say it's not just simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable but removing the sanctuaries [and] removing the support systems. And that's why it has to be a broad and sustained campaign. It's not going to stop if a few criminals are taken care of.



**Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz**



On behalf of all the members of America's Army, I'd like to express my condolences to the families of U.S. citizens killed or injured in the terrorist attacks conducted against the United States on September 11, 2001. I urge all members of the Army to remain vigilant against possible future attacks. Rest assured, America will prevail in the fight against terrorism—and our Army is prepared to do its part!

Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White

No other single action more clearly demonstrates the national resolve than to mobilize the National Guard and Reserve forces of America, . . .

These guardsmen and reservists are just the first to be put on partial mobilization orders. They're joining thousands of other Reserve forces members who



immediately answered the call, either in a state active duty or federal volunteer status. I know I join millions of Americans in saluting them as they leave their jobs and communities to assist in the wake of last week's hideous acts of terrorism in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington.



Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Craig Duehring



It was more than just an attack against the United States, it was an attack against all who embrace the principles of peace and freedom and democracy. . . . Our non-



negotiable contract with the American people is to fight and win the nation's wars, decisively. . . . We expect you to remain trained and ready. Respond quickly and professionally when called. Thank you for what you do to make this Army the magnificent Army that it is. . . . Take care of each other. Be safe. God bless each and every one of you. God bless the Army. God bless America.

Chief of Staff, US Army, General Eric K. Shinseki



We are now facing a challenge unlike any we have known in our history, but we will deal with it in the same way that our armed forces have always responded in times of crisis—confident in our professionalism, resolute in purpose and ready to accomplish our National mission.

Here at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, we will continue to train and grow leaders



for America's future. Our steadfast commitment to the highest standards of institutional leader development will best prepare our officers for this new operating environment and the demands of full spectrum operations.

**Deputy Commandant, USACGSC,
Brigadier General David H. Huntoon, Jr.**

Vulnerability Assessments for Antiterrorism Force Protection Operations

Colonel Clinton J. Ancker III, U.S. Army, Retired

UNIL THE 11 SEPTEMBER terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, we viewed force protection, and especially antiterrorism, as integral parts of all operations. In addition, most of the guidance for installation security is contained in Army regulations. This is in keeping with the division of responsibility where regulations deal primarily with the administrative side of the Army and Field Manuals deal with how the Army conducts operations. The 11th of September may change some of that. One proposal is to make force protection a separate task in the Army Universal Task List and provide the commander and his staff with doctrine on how to execute this new tactical task. As the Army works through the shift in thinking about domestic force protection operations, it has developed some preliminary ideas on how it might adapt existing operational concepts to this task. In addition, the doctrine community is looking at how the Army needs to adjust its thinking about vulnerability, based on the significant change in our enemy's pattern of attack, unveiled by the 11 September attacks. What we are after is a vulnerability analysis methodology that will allow Army forces to better deter, defeat, and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks.

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon demonstrate that the Army's force protection must change. Previously, force protection focused on deterring or defeating low-level attacks against point targets.

The 11 September attacks combined two familiar methods of operation—suicide bombing and aircraft hijacking—in an unexpected asymmetric attack to produce mass casualties and a worldwide media event. The organization that conducted these attacks is well organized, well disciplined, and well funded. The at-

tacks were well planned and synchronized. The targets were chosen carefully. The actions of all involved, including the anticipated actions of the aircraft passengers and crew, were thought through. The 11 September attacks established a new terrorist threat paradigm. The Army's approach to force protection must change to meet that new paradigm.

A key aspect of this change is to refocus how the Army conducts vulnerability assessment. Many of the fundamental principles of military operations are still valid, but the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to apply them to this type of threat are different. The concepts of commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) are made up of priority information requirements (PIR), friendly forces information requirements (FFIR), and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) familiar to anyone who has used the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). By adapting these terms to vulnerability analysis for force protection against terrorism, we leverage familiar concepts at the same time we move beyond their conventional meanings.

Commanders visualize, describe, and direct actions across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict. Central to MDMP, and particularly important for installation force protection (FP), are CCIR and EEFI. The doctrinal application of CCIR and EEFI are just as relevant to installation FP as they are to battlefield operations; however, applying these concepts to installation FP differs in some significant ways from applying them in combat.

The commander needs accurate, timely information to visualize, make decisions, and direct action. CCIR are vital to this process. CCIR are elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decisionmaking and dictate the successful execution of

military operations. CCIR drive and prioritize the information collection plan, subsequent allocation of collection resources, and analysis efforts. Many, if not most, CCIR are directly linked to decision points. Thus, answers to CCIR enable the commander to anticipate required decisions in a timely manner. In domestic FP, the decisions that the commander makes must balance the threat, operational effectiveness, and the resources available.

Developing CCIR for installation FP begins as the commander visualizes the operation and, particularly, the battlespace. The commander has to visualize the factors within the battlespace. From an initial visualization, the commander describes the operation and issues planning guidance. One component of planning guidance is CCIR. To understand the threat, the commander needs to determine several things—these may become PIR.

PIR focus on information about the enemy, terrain, and weather. In installation FP, PIR focus on threat assessment. During times of normal activity, they are broadly stated and address a variety of possible threats. Collection against PIR for FP relies much more on civilian agencies than on organic assets. The Army is largely prohibited from collecting information on domestic threats. Good relations with local and national civilian agencies are critical when installations collect against domestic threats. Therefore, solid relationships with these agencies are critical. The result will be a forecast about terrorist operations and an estimate of potential terrorist targets. Armed with these elements, commanders can make some estimates that can be applied to the formula above. Thus, realistic PIR for installation FP aims at understanding what the enemy is attempting to do and then determining how friendly forces can respond. In essence, the PIR steers the vulnerability analysis.

The episodic nature of the terrorist threat, lack of a clearly defined enemy, lack of organic collection assets, and a diverse set of sources make obtaining PIR a significant challenge. Developing the ability to reach out and tap into information sources is a critical skill for installation staffs.

Because of the inability to direct this PIR collection, the installation must devote significant assets to analyze the available information in an attempt to predict possible threats based on available intelligence. This requires extremely skilled analysts who can deduce threats from information that is often incomplete and unreliable. An additional challenge remains the lack of sufficient numbers of trained intelligence and security personnel at the installation staff level to analyze and refine collected information. Critical considerations to focus PIR for these types of operations are:

- **Determine the terrorists' objectives.** We must understand the terrorists' immediate and long-term objec-

tives. From these we can infer the effects they hope to achieve and identify targets that would allow them to achieve those effects.

- **Determine the terrorists' capabilities.** This step involves determining the most likely methods terrorists might use to attack the target. It involves an analysis of methods used previously, but also requires imagining ways to combine methods in new ways or inferring totally original approaches.

- **Determine the terrorists' intentions.** We must imagine how the terrorists are most likely to use their resources to achieve both their long- and short-term goals. Analysts must be steeped in terrorist philosophy, thinking, and culture. As threats become more defined, the PIR are changed to focus in on suspected threats and to determine both their potential targets and the means to attack them.

FFIR are those elements of information that the commander and staff need about friendly forces. In installation FP, FFIR has two major categories: installation vulnerability and installation response capabilities. First, the commander and staff need information about the vulnerability of the installation to terrorist attacks. During routine operations, this takes the form of general awareness vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities must be assessed against known patterns of terrorist operations, but should also be assessed against criteria of what would cause the most damage should a terrorist target it. While the first is fairly straightforward and based on an analysis of past terrorist actions, the second is much more difficult to ascertain. Determining vulnerabilities requires both imagination and the ability to think from the perspective of a terrorist planning to attack the installation asymmetrically and unconventionally. This vulnerability analysis must be an ongoing process.

As with PIR, when a more specific threat is identified, the commander changes his FFIR to focus on specific means and known targets of the suspected terrorist. The installation commander must then direct execution measures to eliminate or mitigate the threat's capabilities in regards to the suspected vulnerabilities.

The second area of FFIR for FP is the command's ability to respond to a terrorist attack. During routine operations, FFIR must be broadly focused on the command's ability to respond to a wide range of threats. When threats begin to take definite form, FFIR must focus on the command's ability to deter or respond to the threat.

The installation commander uses the answers to PIR and FFIR to make decisions. For the most part, his decisions on FP fall into two categories: implementation of security measures and execution of a response to a terrorist attack and its aftermath.

During routine operations, the commander assesses

his security posture based on known and suspected threats. Security measures are based on balancing the ability of the command to conduct normal business and the probability of an attack. The goal is usually to minimize disruption of daily life, consistent with the threat. Other decisions concern improving the command's ability to respond to terrorist threats. If an analysis of past terrorist actions and potential future actions requires specific kinds of response teams, such as teams capable of resolving a hostage situation or of cleaning up after a biological attack, the commander must assess if he has teams with the necessary training and equipment available. Because potential threats will always outstrip available resources, the commander must use answers to PIR (potential threats) and FFIR (potential vulnerabilities) to determine where to place scarce resources. In addition to these decisions, the commander must establish EEFI.

Once the installation has determined its vulnerabilities, the commander will use EEFI to protect as much critical information as possible. EEFI are critical information about friendly forces that if known by the enemy would compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the friendly force. Operations security (OPSEC) is the process commanders follow to protect EEFI. Under normal conditions OPSEC consists of actions necessary to prevent a broad category of useful information from falling into the wrong hands. While most soldiers and Department of the Army civilians are familiar with standard OPSEC procedures for combat operations, we have not created the same kind of awareness of OPSEC for antiterrorist measures. EEFI for domestic FP against terrorism is also a derivative of vulnerability analysis. Guided by the vulnerability analysis, the commander and staff attempt to forecast the likely effects of information compromise on the security of the installation, and then devise measures to protect this information from disclosure.

As answers to PIR clarify the threat, the commander will reach decision points relating to implementing OPSEC and physical security measures against the specific threat. This will include establishing higher states of access control, guarding key personnel and assets, and possibly rehearsing response drills. In addition, based on a specific threat, the commander will revise the EEFI to protect information that would assist the terrorist in carrying out an attack.

An integral part of MDMP is risk analysis. Risk analysis gives the commander a tool for balancing FP requirements with mission accomplishment. Shutting down the installation and creating a "fortress" would provide near-airtight security. For every set of security measures, there remains a residual risk. If the residual risk is excessive, the commander

must implement additional measures to further reduce it. Residual risk is always balanced against the need to continue operations.

Past practices are not necessarily the solution to future threats. It is possible that the 11 September attackers used our well-established procedures for dealing with hijackings against us. Previous hijackers had used aircraft and passengers as bargaining chips rather than bombs. The assumption that the 11 September hijackings would follow that model may have resulted in passengers not resisting the hijackers until too late. Assume your enemy is thinking as hard as you are, is conducting after action reviews, and is looking for ways to turn your protective measures into new vulnerabilities.

Vulnerability assessment must examine possible weakness that might arise from an installation's responses. Countering terrorist attempts to use our security measures against us requires looking at secondary and tertiary effects of these measures, and assessing how predictable they are. Look at each measure from a terrorist standpoint to determine how a terrorist might turn a measure we implement against us. For example, lining up thousands of military people outside installations while searching all vehicles makes them easily identified stationary targets. Measures that make it difficult to get onto post might also make it difficult to evacuate the post in case of a chemical or biological attack. Our predictability in our responses is a weakness in itself. Terrorists are creative, thinking opponents.

Over the past decade, we have focused much energy on protecting the United States from weapons of mass destruction and from cyberattack. That these have not occurred is not to say that they will not, or that we should not take measures to deter or respond to them. Rather, our focus on these high-tech threats may have diverted our attention from less sophisticated but still deadly means of attack. This is not a matter of scale, but of asymmetric approaches. Deterrence or response in one scenario may be useless or counterproductive in another. Vulnerability assessments must examine a broader range of threats. They need to look not only at the worst case scenario, but at threats that range from high- to low-tech and from simple to complex.

Force protection of our installations will be an important part of our lives for the foreseeable future. We will have to be as creative as our adversary if we are going to be successful. We cannot simply rely on what has worked in the past. A systematic approach to developing PIR, FFIR and EEFI, developed by creative thinkers and targeted against a creative enemy, will help in this mission. **MR**

Colonel Clinton J. Ancker III, U.S. Army, Retired, is director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy; master's degrees from Long Island University, Stanford University and from the Naval War College; and is a graduate of USACGSC. He has served in various command and staff positions in Vietnam, Kuwait, and the Continental United States. Before assuming his position as director, he was chief of the Military Liaison Team to Albania.



A New Kind of War

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

PRESIDENT BUSH is rallying the nation for a war against terrorism's attack on our way of life. Some believe the first casualty of any war is the truth. But in this war, the first victory must be to tell the truth. And the truth is, this will be a war like none other our nation has faced. Indeed, it is easier to describe what lies ahead by talking about what it is not rather than what it is.

This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways. Some will provide diplomatic support, others financial, still others logistical or military. Some will help us publicly, while others, because of their circumstances, may help us privately and secretly. In this war, the mission will define the coalition—not the other way around.

We understand that countries we consider our

friends may help with certain efforts or be silent on others, while other actions we take may depend on the involvement of countries we have considered less than friendly.

In this context, the decision by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia—friends of the United States—to break ties with the Taliban is an important early success of this campaign but should not suggest they will be a part of every action we may contemplate.

This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways.

Originally published in The New York Times, Thursday, 27 September 2001.

But if this is a different kind of war, one thing is unchanged: America remains indomitable. Our victory will come with Americans living their lives day by day, going to work, raising their children, and building their dreams as they always have—a free and great people.

This war will not necessarily be one in which we pore over military targets and mass forces to seize those targets. Instead, military force will likely be one of many tools we use to stop individuals, groups, and countries that engage in terrorism.




Our response may include firing cruise missiles into military targets somewhere in the world; we are just as likely to engage in electronic combat to track and stop investments moving through offshore banking centers. The uniforms of this conflict will be bankers' pinstripes and programmers' grunge just as assuredly as desert camouflage.

This is not a war against an individual, a group, a religion, or a country. Rather, our opponent is a global network of terrorist organizations and their state sponsors, committed to denying free people the opportunity to live as they choose. While we may engage militarily against foreign governments that sponsor terrorism, we may also seek to make allies of the people those governments suppress.

Even the vocabulary of this war will be different.

When we "invade the enemy's territory," we may well be invading his cyberspace. There may not be as many beachheads stormed as opportunities de-



nied. Forget about "exit strategies"; we are looking at a sustained engagement that carries no deadlines. We have no fixed rules about how to deploy our troops; we will instead establish guidelines to determine whether military force is the best way to achieve a given objective.

The public may see some dramatic military en-



agements that produce no apparent victory or may be unaware of other actions that lead to major victories. "Battles" will be fought by customs officers stopping suspicious persons at our borders and diplomats securing cooperation against money laundering.

But if this is a different kind of war, one thing is unchanged: America remains indomitable. Our victory will come with Americans living their lives day by day, going to work, raising their children and building their dreams as they always have—a free and great people.**MR**



**"The battle is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver,
we will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.**

Peace and freedom will prevail. . . .

**To all the men and women in our military, every sailor,
every soldier, every airman, every coast guardsman, every marine,
I say this: Your mission is defined. The objectives are clear.
Your goal is just. You have my full confidence, and you will have
every tool you need to carry out your duty."**

President George W. Bush